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Abstract
Game theoretic tools are utilized to analyze a one-locus continuous selection
model of sex-specific meiotic drive by considering nonequivalence of the viabil-
ities of reciprocal heterozygotes that might be noticed at an imprinted locus.
The model draws attention to the role of viability selections of different types
to examine the stable nature of polymorphic equilibrium. A bridge between
population genetics and evolutionary game theory has been built up by apply-
ing the concept of the Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection. In addition
to pointing out the influences of male and female segregation ratios on selec-
tion, configuration structure reveals some noted results, e.g., Hardy-Weinberg
frequencies hold in replicator dynamics, occurrence of faster evolution at the
maximized variance fitness, existence of mixed Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
(ESS) in asymmetric games, the tending evolution to follow not only a 1 : 1 sex
ratio but also a 1 : 1 different alleles ratio at particular gene locus. Through con-
struction of replicator dynamics in the group selection framework, our selection
model introduces a redefining bases of game theory to incorporate non-random
mating where a mating parameter associated with population structure is de-
pendent on the social structure. Also, the model exposes the fact that the
number of polymorphic equilibria will depend on the algebraic expression of
population structure.
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1. Introduction
Mendel demonstrates that a hybrid between two different varieties possesses
both types of parental factors in the gametes (the principle of segregation)
and the two individual genes in a particular gene pair (2 alleles) are equally
represented in its gametes. Segregation distorters, however, violate this rule by
biasing segregation in their favor. Generally, Segregation distortion refers to any
distortion of meiosis or gametogenesis such that one of a pair chromosomes in a
heterozygote is recovered in greater than half of the progeny [1]. The associated
gene is said to “drive” and the phenomenon of meiotic drive is the subset of seg-
regation distortion. In an extended sense, a segregation distorter/meiotic drive
gene is nothing but the paradigmatic category of selfish genetic elements because
such elements are either neutral or detrimental to the organism’s fitness [2]. The
genes found in an inversion on chromosome 2 of Drosophila melanogaster and
t-complex in mice are tailored to explain the segregation distortion mechanism.
As segregation distorters occur in many species and are likely to be very
common [1, 3], a fascinating mathematical theory has been developed through
mathematical models to answer the questions concerning the stability and evo-
lution of Mendelian segregation (see Feldman and Otto [4], Haig and Grafen [5],
Weissing and van Boven [6], U´beda and Haig [7] and references therein). U´beda
and Haig [7] were the first population geneticists to formulate a one-locus sex-
specific segregation distortion model by including a genomic imprinting concept.
They provided a numerical analysis of the equilibria, finding examples of pa-
rameter sets with three polymorphic equilibria in which at most two of them
were stable. It was also noted that, in general, population mean fitness is not
maximized at polymorphic equilibria.
It is seen that since the main stream of studies of evolutionary game dynam-
ics basically concentrates on the evolution of strategies in animal conflicts, the
evolutionary dynamics of population genetic mechanisms is often neglected in
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the context of evolutionary game theory. In the majority of cases, neglecting the
underlying genetic architecture in detail, the models of evolutionary structure
are developed in the mentioned research field where it has been tried to set up a
relation between population genetics and evolutionary game theory through the
perception of evolutionary stable strategies and quantitative genetics [8, 9, 10].
Most of the evolutionary game theorists believe that, besides the evolution of
phenotypes, game dynamics is only directly applicable to study of a single lo-
cus haploid genetic model; consequently, genetics related focus has mainly been
confined in haploid structure [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. However, it is frequently
argued that it can equally be applied to study of the more complex genetic evo-
lution than asexual. In the recent years, the concepts of stochastic evolutionary
dynamics [17, 18, 19] and coalescence theory [20, 21, 22] have built a stable
foundation between evolutionary game theory and population genetics.
A bridge between population genetics and game theory is constructed by
a simple relabeling of terms. Any single-locus, diploid model in population
genetics can be interpreted as a game in which individuals are the players and
distinct alleles are the strategies [23, 24, 25] where the frequencies of genes act
as meanfitness optimizer [26]. However, based on different framework structure,
game theory for diploid population has also been studied in many literatures
[27, 28, 29, 30]. Recently, in the context of meiotic derive Traulsen and Reed
[25] have formulated a model of diploid population by considering an interaction
between alleles in a diploid genome as a two player game. The dynamics is
studied through the well-known replicator equation and meiotic derive has been
explained as a social dilemma such as the prisoner’s dilemma or the snowdrift
game. Cyclic dominance found in the rock-paper-scissors game is also embedded
in their model.
In general, the evolutionary game theorists use the replicator dynamics to
considering game with 2 player or many players in well-mixed large popula-
tion because its equilibrium concept, an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) –
refinement of Nash equilibrium, ESS is an asymptotically stable state of the
evolutionary dynamics – positively describes evolutionary outcomes in environ-
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ments. However, there are many population games with non-random matching,
concerning to games of group selection [31, 32, 33] where formation shows some
assortment. At this point, we can not deny that the group selection is not
the correct expression for what is just non-random matching because the non-
random can be coped with in the usual evolutionary framework, in the way in
which the concept of non-random matching merely needs to be built into the
definition of the game (see Taylor and Nowak [34]). In a particular sense, match-
ing is typically assortative meaning that individuals have a higher probability of
being matched with other like-natured individuals than with different-natured
individuals.
Since the population structure plays a crucial role in evolutionary theory,
the canonical group selection models [35, 36, 37] can also influence the genetic
literature. The canonical group selection model is called either the haystack
model or the multi-level selection model. In order to construct the relation be-
tween group selection replicator dynamics and population structure, van Veelen
[38] partitions the whole population into groups of size n, within which n-player
game is played where group state representing the group frequencies of the dif-
ferent types of the groups in the population, forms the population structure.
In the model, fitness is assigned to individuals (individualist perspective; see
Kerr and Godfrey-Smith [39] and references therein) rather than to the groups
in such a way that replicator dynamics depends only on average payoffs of the
individuals similar to the game selection model. However, such models can for-
mally recast so that groups are fitness bearing. It was Kerr and Godfrey-Smith
[39] who provided a detailed analysis of the multi-level selection model in the
two strategy case. In the recent work of Jensen and Rigos [40], the thought of
matching rule is elaborated to any number of strategies by means of a rigorous
formalism. Using the analytical thinking of structural conception of replicator
dynamics, the model framework draws a concrete line between game and group
selection theories.
In this article, I extend a traditional model for selection at an autosomal im-
printed locus in a sex-differentiated population, by considering the sex-specific
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viability with assigning separate viabilities to reciprocal heterozygotes. Allow-
ing overlapping generations, U´beda and Haig [7]’s discrete genetic framework
has been used to develop continuous governing equations of evolutionary dy-
namics, namely replicator dynamics where, implementing the transmission ra-
tio distortion rules at an imprinted locus, the concept of segregation distortion
is incorporated. The group selection version of replicator dynamics is also in-
troduced to examine the non-random influence. Here, my main intention is to
formulate a set of link-results between evolutionary game theory and population
genetics following the path constructed by Traulsen and Reed [25].
2. The model of evolutionary dynamics
We pay attention to a specific type of evolutionary dynamics, called replica-
tor dynamics to address the question, whether a polymorphic population with
the two - population profiles can also be stable by generating the ESS. In the
evolutionary game, it is assumed that individuals are programmed to use only
pure strategies and passes this behavior to its descendants without modification;
because of that the individuals in such selection dynamics are called replicators,
existed in several different types [13, 15, 41, 42]. As the success of evolutionary
game dynamics is defined by the fitness of individuals, considering a pairwise
contest population game with different action sets and different payoff matrices,
in the context of well-mixed populations, the evolutionary game dynamics can
be written as
x˙i = xi(pi1(e
i, Y )− pi1(X,Y )),
y˙i = yi(pi2(e
i, X)− pi2(Y,X)) (2.1)
where pi1(X,Y )) and pi2(Y,X)) signify the expected fitness payoffs of the two
populations when the frequencies of types relating to strategy ei (unit vector)
are xi and yi, and corresponding average fitnesses of types are given by pi1(e
i, Y )
and pi2(e
i, X).
Letting the pairwise contest population game being performed among alleles
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at a single locus, we move to the field of population genetics to establish that
game theoretic perspective and population genetic perspective lead to exactly
the same dynamics in respect of equations (2.1)which govern allele frequencies.
Consider an infinite, panmictic diploid population. The viability of genotypes
A1A1, A1A2, A2A1 and A2A2 in males are designed as W11, W12, W21 and
W22, with corresponding values V11, V12, V21, V22 in females where in males the
autosomal allele written first has a paternal origin while the one written second
has a maternal origin whereas paternally inherited alleles are listed second in
the females. By explicitly considering perfect transmission of one allele in one
sex and the other allele in the opposite sex, let the segregation ration of A1
be k in male meiosis and κ in female meiosis, while the corresponding rations
for A2 are (1 − k) and (1 − κ) (0 < k, κ < 1). That is values of k, κ less
than one-half can be interpreted as segregation distortion in favor of A2 or
negative segregation distortion of A1 in respect of particular sex. The term
“drive” is used by Burt and Trivers [2] to denote the greater than Mendelian
(“super-Mendelian”) transmission of a selfish genetic element, whereas “drag”
is the opposite implying less than Mendelian inheritance (“sub-Mendelian”).
And hence if we let the frequency of gametes A1, A2 be xt, 1 − xt in sperm
and yt, 1− yt in eggs, then in the mating pool for the following generation the
frequencies of male allele A1s and female allele A1s are [7, 43]
xt+∆t =
W11xtyt + k(W12xt(1− yt) +W21yt(1− xt))
W11xtyt +W12xt(1− yt) +W21yt(1− xt) +W22(1− xt)(1− yt)
,
yt+∆t =
V11xtyt + κ(V12xt(1− yt) + V21yt(1− xt))
V11xtyt + V12xt(1− yt) + V21yt(1− xt) + V22(1− xt)(1− yt)
. (2.2)
Differential expression of genes depending on their parental origin is referred
to genomic imprinting that can cause reciprocal heterozygotes to have distin-
guishable phenotypes and different viabilities. Here, considering W12, V21 being
constants over time, we introduce the following genomic imprinting relations:
W21 = W12
xt(1− yt)
yt(1− xt) = W12rxtyt and V12 = V21
yt(1− xt)
xt(1− yt) = V21rytxt .
Therefore, the converted form of the system of equations is
xt+∆t =
W11xtyt + 2kW12xt(1− yt)
W11xtyt +W12xt(1− yt) +W21yt(1− xt) +W22(1− xt)(1− yt)
,
yt+∆t =
V11xtyt + 2κV21yt(1− xt)
V11xtyt + V12xt(1− yt) + V21yt(1− xt) + V22(1− xt)(1− yt)
. (2.3)
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In order to transform equations (2.3) from discrete to continuous time, based
on the concept of Mendelian segregation principle, we set Wij = 1 + ∆twij ,
Vij = 1 + ∆tvij (i, j = 1, 2), 2kW12 = 1 + 2∆tkw12, 2κV21 = 1 + 2∆tκv21 , and,
assuming time between replication events much less than one, i.e., ∆t 1, the
system of equations(2.3), can be approximated as [13, 25]
xt+∆t = xt
1 + ∆t(w11yt + 2kw12(1− yt)
1 + ∆t(w11xtyt + w12xt(1− yt) + w21yt(1− xt) + w22(1− xt)(1− yt))
≈ xt + ∆t(wyt− < w >),
yt+∆t = yt
1 + ∆t(v11xt + 2κv21(1− xt)
1 + ∆t(v11xtyt + v12xt(1− yt) + v21yt(1− xt) + v22(1− xt)(1− yt))
≈ yt + ∆t(vxt− < v >). (2.4)
Taking ∆t tending to zero and dropping the index for discrete time, the time
continuous evolutionary game dynamics (2.1) is recovered by
x˙ = x(wy− < w >),
y˙ = y(vx− < v >) (2.5)
where wy = w11y + 2kw12(1− y) and vx = v11x+ 2κv21(1− x) are the average
fitnesses of the male and female A1 alleles while < w > = w11xy + 2w12x(1 −
y) +w22(1−x)(1− y) and < v > = v11xy+ 2v21y(1−x) + v22(1−x)(1− y) are
the average fitness in the male and female allele populations. And the payoff
matrices for the interactions, describing the interactions of each member of the
male allele population with every member of the female allele population and
vice versa are
Male population Female population
A1 : y A2 : 1− y A1 : x A2 : 1− x
A1 : x w11 2kw12 A1 : y v11 2κv21
A2 : 1− x 2(1− k)w12rxy w22 A2 : 1− y 2(1− κ)v21ryx v22
In the overlapping generations, the non-constant viabilities of heterozy-
gotes, w21 and v12, have no direct influence on the average fitnesses of male
and female allele populations. Because of that, we shall call them pseudo fit-
nesses in the population fitness structure. Realistically, we can assume that
the boundary values of the pseudo fitnesses on the boundary of the strategy
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region, {0 ≤ x ≤ 1, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1}, are undefined or maximum or finite because
0
0 is in-determinant: we can get anything at all from a
0
0 situation. As the
model is designed to think the interaction of two alleles at one locus of diploid
genome and frequencies of alleles are optimizer of average fitness, the obtained
selection dynamics builds the genotype-phenotype mapping structure through
payoff matrices [25, 26]. However, we can not, here, say an evolutionary game
i.e., frequency dependent selection, between alleles/haploids, is translated to the
constant selection i.e., frequency-independent selection, in the diploids system
because the pseudo fitnesses are non-constant.
Next, let us turn to a group dynamics in perspective of group formation of
male and female alleles. The concept introduces the non-random mating struc-
ture. We consider a group formation procedure through the games of Mendelian
segregation and segregation distortion between any two allelic pairs of the four
pairs (units), one of the alleles of each pair belonging to the male population
and other allele to the female population, and allow any kind of group (pair)
formation in respect of two strategies (those interpret phenotypic characters) –
C, defines the character of cooperating (attempting to cooperate) and D, links
to the character of defecting (attempting to defect). As the genotype codes for
the phenotype, to analyze the framework in genotypic flavor, here, we assume
that the phenotypic character of cooperating is revealed by the allele A1 while
the allele A2 causes the phenotypic character of defecting. The abundancy of
A1 shows the character of cooperating in the population. Our intention is to
analyze how the frequency of C allele is influenced in two cases of real interest
where k > κ and where κ > k. fi,j and νj,i are frequency of groups in the male
allele population and the female allele population respectively where i = 0, 1
and j = 0, 1, and each frequency term is defined as the frequency of the group
with (i+j) C alleles and 2−(i+j) D alleles in it. As the population states in the
male allele population and the female allele population are to be characterized
by f = (f0,0, ..., f1,1) and ν = (ν0,0, ..., ν1,1) respectively, these frequencies have
to satisfy the conditions
∑2
i=0
∑2
j=0 fi,j = 1 and
∑2
j=0
∑2
i=0 νj,i = 1 (compare
with van Veelen [38], Kerr and Godfrey-Smith [39], Jensen and Rigos [40]); i.e.,
f(t) belongs to 3-dimensional simplex ∆1 and it is defined on the trajectories of
dynamical field as well as one to one corresponding with the population struc-
ture function fˆ : [0, 1] × [0, 1] → ∆1 while ν(t) is defined on the trajectories of
dynamical field on 3-dimensional simplex ∆2 through one to one corresponding
with the population structure function νˆ : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ ∆2 (see Appendix A).
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Fig. 1: Evolutionary group selection between male allele population and female allele pop-
ulation separately. The four distinct groups of each sex participate in the selection. Each
group of each sex, separated by two different colors, is composed of two alleles whose phe-
notypic characters are characterized by cooperating and defecting denoted by the light and
dark circles. Proportions of C alleles and D alleles in the different configurations of the
four groups in the male population and the female population have been shown along the
left margins of the payoff matrices. And, along the top margins of matrices, frequencies
of the impacts of different effective viabilities on the distinct groups are placed. In each
group of males, the first entity (i.e., first allele) corresponds to the paternal origin while
the second entity corresponds to the maternal origin whereas paternal and maternal en-
tities appear in reverse order in the each group of females. It is noted that in male al-
lelic pair (A2, A1), effective viability of A2 is to be 2(1 − k)w12rpq while effective viabil-
ity of A1 is 2kw12rpq . And, in view of this observation, the payoff functions can be ex-
pressed in terms of effective viabilities (combined effect of viability and segregation ratio)
in the following way: ( piC,0,1 piC,1,0 piC,1,1
piD,0,0 piD,0,1 piD,1,0
) = (
2kw12rpq 2kw12 w11
w22 2(1 − k)w12rpq 2(1 − k)w12
)
and (
pi
′
C,0,1 pi
′
C,1,0 pi
′
C,1,1
pi
′
D,0,0 pi
′
D,0,1 pi
′
D,1,0
) = (
2κv21rqp 2κv21 v11
v22 2(1 − κ)v21rqp 2(1 − κ)v21
).
The associated viability selection structure of this non-random selection model
has been explained and presented by the schematic diagram, Fig.1. Hence, if
the frequencies of male-C alleles and female-C alleles are denoted by p and q
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respectively, then the system of equations (2.5), becomes
p˙ = p
( 1
2p
1∑
i=0
1∑
j=0
(i+ j)fˆi,j(p, q)piC,i,j −
[ p
2p
1∑
i=0
1∑
j=0
(i+ j)fˆi,j(p, q)piC,i,j
+
1− p
2(1− p)
1∑
i=0
1∑
j=0
(2− (i+ j))fˆi,j(p, q)piD,i,j
])
,
q˙ = q
( 1
2q
1∑
j=0
1∑
i=0
(i+ j)νˆj,i(q, p)pi
′
C,j,i −
[ q
2q
1∑
j=0
1∑
i=0
(i+ j)νˆj,i(q, p)pi
′
C,j,i
+
1− q
2(1− q)
1∑
j=0
1∑
i=0
(2− (i+ j))νˆj,i(q, p)pi
′
D,j,i
])
. (2.6)
To ensure the existence of solutions and uniqueness of solutions, we will assume
that fˆ and νˆ are Lipschitz continuous such that f(t) = fˆ(p(t), q(t)) and ν(t) =
νˆ(q(t), p(t)).
It is important to note that in any selection dynamics, genic and genotypic
analyses are both valid but processes of the analyses follow up in the different
ways. In random mating population, the genic fitness of male allele A1 relative
to male allele A2 is
w1
w2
= xw11+(1−x)w12xw12+(1−x)w22 . The equilibrium frequency x
∗ can be
found by setting w1 = w2 (see Haig [26] and reference therein). In the following
sections, the evolution frameworks are analyzed in perspectives of evolution-
ary game theory as well as group selection under the common configuration
arrangement of associated biological parameters.
3. Existence and stability of polymorphic equilibrium
3.1. Population genetics in evolutionary game theory framework
Mathematically, an equilibrium point (x∗, y∗), is a point that satisfies the
system of equations {x˙ = 0, y˙ = 0} and if a solution starts at this point, it
remains there forever; i.e., at equilibrium, allele frequency remains unaltered
overtime. According to the structural framework, here, natures of equilibrium
points are classified into the two categories – trivial and nontrivial where in the
trivial equilibrium point either A1 or A2 is absent.
At the equilibrium point (x∗, y∗), the system of equations (2.5), can be
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written in the following way,
x∗(1− x∗)
[(
w11 − 2(1− k)w12 x
∗(1− y∗)
y∗(1− x∗)
)
y∗ +
(
2kw12 − w22
)
(1− y∗)
]
= 0,
y∗(1− y∗)
[(
v11 − 2(1− κ)v21 y
∗(1− x∗)
x∗(1− y∗)
)
x∗ +
(
2κv21 − v22
)
(1− x∗)
]
= 0. (3.1)
Therefore, the trivial equilibrium can only be calculated at wij = vji = 0 (i 6= j)
and the equilibrium points are E0 = (0, 0), E1 = (0, 1), E2 = (1, 0), E3 =
(1, 1), and E4 = (
v22
v11+v22
, w22w11+w22 ) where the last one is nontrivial equilibrium.
Exclude the constraint wij = vji = 0(i 6= j), and assuming there are no trivial
equilibria, the system of equations (3.1), is expressed as,
a1x
∗ + a2y∗ − a3x∗y∗ = a4,
a5x
∗ + a6y∗ − a7x∗y∗ = a8 (3.2)
where a1 = w22 − 2w12, a2 = w11 − 2kw12 + w22, a3 = w11 − 2w12 + w22,
a4 = w22−2kw12, a5 = v11−2κv21+v22, a6 = v22−2v21, a7 = v11−2v21+v22 and
a8 = v22 − 2κv21. Hence, as in the system of equations (3.2), (x∗, y∗) 6= (1, 1),
there exists only one nontrivial equilibrium, which denotes by E5. Presently,
for the sake of analysis, we introduce some special terminologies associated with
heterozygote effect, e.g., the additive selections refer to the fitness effects which
are additive, the recessive selections refer to the fitness effects which are recessive
; and restrict ourself around the polymorphic equilibrium E5.
Comparative study on the numerical data structure reveals that, except
the additive selection, in the cases of dominant, recessive and overdominant
selections, non trivial equilibrium E5 exists where only in the recessive selection
nature of the equilibrium point is unstable (saddle point). As at the trivial
equilibrium points, pseudo fitnesses w21 and v12 are undefined, it is beyond the
scope of this article to verify whether Prout Criterion [44] is applicable to find
out the nature of polymorphic equilibrium, E5. The possibility of arising the
stable polymorphic equilibrium is high in the overdominance structure which is a
well-known result having been shown in Fig.2 where either κ+k = 1 or κ = k or
both relations are held in a wide range in comparison to the dominant viability
11
First Column Second Column Third Column
Fig. 2: Array representation of viability effect on the existence and stability conditions of
the internal equilibrium. We consider different alleles are favored in the two sexes where
w21 and v12 are pseudo fitnesses (two variable quantities) of the population fitness structure.
The effects of the dominance fitnesses are presented along the first column in which the fitness
ranges being ( 1 1.5 : 1 : 2.5
w21 1.5 : 1 : 2.5
) and ( 1.5 : 1 : 2.5 v12
1.5 : 1 : 2.5 1
). In the second and third columns the
outcomes of the recessive and overdominant selection effects have been plotted respectively,
where the fitness ranges are ( 1 1
w21 1.5 : 1 : 2.5
) and ( 1.5 : 1 : 2.5 v12
1 1
) in the second column,
and in the third column the fitness ranges are ( 1 1.5 : 1 : 2.5
w21 1.2
) and ( 1.2 v12
1.5 : 1 : 2.5 1
).
Sex-specific fitness arrays having linear increment of components are one to one correspondence
with each other. Spring 1 colored shaded region in (k, κ) space yields one stable equilibrium
while one unstable equilibrium is to be found in Spring 2 colored shaded region.
effect. To plot the figures we have considered that different alleles are favored
in the two sexes. If, in spite of different alleles, same alleles are favored in the
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two sexes, then it can be shown that the possibility of existence of equilibrium
at the Mendelian segregation is low where in most of the cases the Mendelian
segregation point becomes a boundary point of the stable or unstable regions
[43, 45]. Here, it is noticeable observation that when alleles A1 are favored in
the both sexes, the shaded region relating to feasible solution in (k, κ) space
tries to spread toward the (0, 0) corner and on the contrary when the both
sexes favor alleles A2, the shaded region tries to spread toward the opposite
corner, (1, 1). This observation has a simple biological interpretation. At the
equilibrium circumstance, the abundant presence of allele A1 means that allele
A2 will be transmitted to a fraction (1− k) of its bearers’ sperm and a fraction
(1− κ) of its bearers’ eggs where the transmitted rate of A2 is higher than that
of A1 and sperm will fertilize eggs in such a way that A2 can invade a gene pool
near fixation for A1. On the other hand, at the equilibrium circumstance, the
abundant presence of allele A2 means that allele A1 will be transmitted to a
fraction k of its bearers’ sperm and a fraction κ of its bearers’ eggs where the
transmitted rate of A1 is higher than that of A2 and sperm will fertilize eggs in
such a way that A1 can invade a gene pool near fixation for A2 [7].
3.2. Population genetics in group selection framework
Without loss of generality, to find out the effects of segregation ratios (k, κ)
and mating parameter, α, on the frequencies of male-C alleles and female-C
alleles, we fix the following set of viabilities in both sexes: (1, s, 1.5) where s is the
fitness of heterozygote, and mating parameter, α has been defined in Appendix
B. The mating parameter is a scale parameter of the population structure of
mixture of random grouping and clonal interaction where a population state is
characterized by the frequencies of four allelic pairs (a group state). The scale
parameter calibrates the non-randomness, ranging from 0 to 1. Value α = 0
marks the random mating while the clonal interaction character is indicated by
the value of α = 1.
Considering equations (2.6), it is easy to show that, under any population
structure, an interior state (p∗, q∗) is an equilibrium if and only if: piC(p∗, q∗) =
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piD(p
∗, q∗) and pi
′
C(q
∗, p∗) = pi
′
D(q
∗, p∗) simultaneously hold, i.e.,
b1p
∗ + b2q∗ + b3p∗q∗ = b4,
b5p
∗ + b6q∗ + b7p∗q∗ = b8 (3.3)
where b1 = α+ 2(1− α)s− 1.5, b2 = (1− α)(2ks− 2.5), b3 = (1− α)(2.5− 2s),
b4 = α + 2(1 − α)ks − 1.5, b5 = (1 − α)(2κs − 2.5), b6 = α + 2(1 − α)s − 1.5,
b7 = (1 − α)(2.5 − 2s) and b8 = α + 2(1 − α)κs − 1.5. Similar to the previous
subsection, we assume that there are no trivial equilibria, and as, consequence
of that assumption, in equations 3.3 (p∗, q∗) 6= (1, 1), there exists only nontrivial
equilibrium E6.
Here in this subsection too, as the close form of the root E6 is sufficiently
complicated as well as long and as it has no insight other than the algebraic
logic, in order to analyze the group selection framework we give emphasis on
the data analysis. And the most significant observation is that the possibil-
ity of existence of internal equilibrium, E6 is low in (k, κ) space when mating
nature is becoming non-random. Moreover, at the point of complete segrega-
Fig. 3: Row representation of viability effect on the existence and stability conditions of the
internal equilibrium. The first figure corresponds to the recessive selection of α = 0.6 whereas
the second and third figures, in the common value of s = 2 of overdominant selection, are
plotted with values of α = 0.7 and α = 0.8 respectively. Color interpretations are same as in
Fig.2.
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tion (clonal interaction) the internal equilibrium is disappeared. However, we
can not expect that the clonal interaction and underdominant selection with
wi,j = vj,i = 0(i 6= j) would give rise to analogous dynamics because we have
seen in the previous subsection that the underdominant selection presents a dy-
namics with internal equilibrium. Later, the nature of internal equilibrium in
the underdominant selection will be examined. Similar to the random mating,
here internal equilibrium is also absent in the additive selection.
Stable nature is bifurcated at a fixed value of the mating parameter α of the
overdominant selection that being shown in Fig.3. Exploring the sequence of
figures, with s = 2, in the range 0 ≤ α ≤ 0.7, a stable nature of decreasing region
in (k, κ) space, which tends towards (1, 1) corner is noticed and this stable region
becomes unstable for further increasing in α past 0.7. Manually, one can find
out the bifurcation value of α. However, the plot configuration strongly suggests
that the bifurcation value of α is directly influenced by heterozygote fitness value
s and this is why, with higher value of s the stable nature of decreasing region
in (k, κ) space remains unaltered throughout the range 0 ≤ α < 1. On the
other hand, in the range 0 ≤ α ≤ 0.7 of the dominant selection and in the range
0 ≤ α ≤ 0.6 of the recessive selection the obtained feasible regions in (k, κ)
space are stable and unstable respectively. Out side of these ranges, the regions
in (k, κ) space become the regions connected to the non feasible solutions.
4. The model analysis
4.1. Population genetics in evolutionary
game theory framework
Fig. 4: Underdominant selection: favoring the
same alleles in the two sexes
Examples of heterozygote inferior-
ity (underdominance) in nature are
relatively few, unless a species lives in
a coarse-grained environment where
there is strong selection for alterna-
tive homozygous genotypes. How-
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ever, to assess the strategies involving chromosome translocations in genetic
control, the models of underdominance are useful [46].
In the present model, heterozygote inferiority yields five equilibria. Two
of them, the equilibrium points E0 and E3, are stable and size of a basin of
attraction is dependent on the viability strength, which is revealed in Fig.4,
plotted with the set value ((w11 = 2, w22 = 1), (v11 = 2, v22 = 1)), although if
different alleles are favored in the two sexes under the condition, w22 = v11 or
w11 = v22, then the obtained basins of attraction are of equal size, and in the
sense, x∗ + y∗ = 1, the polymorphic equilibrium E4 changes the position along
the principal diagonal with the variation of viability parameters.
In conventional procedure of evolutionary game theory, the underdominance
viabilities (payoffs) are presented as the outcomes of the bimatrix game:
Male population Female population
A1 : y A2 : 1− y A1 : x A2 : 1− x
A1 : x w11 0 A1 : y v11 0
A2 : 1− x 0 w22 A2 : 1− y 0 v22
The game has two Nash equilibrium points in pure strategies, namely
(A1, A1), (A2, A2), and another Nash equilibrium point in mixed strategies
(( v22v11+v22 ,
v11
v11+v22
), ( w22w11+w22 ,
w11
w11+w22
)), with the corresponding values of ex-
pected payoffs (average fitnesses),
(< w >,< v >) = (pi1(X
∗, Y ∗) =
w11w22
w11 + w22
, pi2(Y
∗, X∗) =
v11v22
v11 + v22
).
From this standpoint, we can conclude that the population mean fitness of both
sexes is maximized at the dynamical equilibrium point over those variables that
the allele controls, under the assumption that the other allele’s variables of the
opposite sex are held fixed. However, as pi1(e
i, ei) > pi1(X
∗, Y ∗), pi2(ei, ei) >
pi2(Y
∗, X∗) (i = 1, 2) and as, according to the Fundamental Theorem of Natural
Selection, fitness is increased or remains the same over time (in other words,
the natural selection does not allow a population to decrease in average fitness),
thus it is clearly expected in the evolutionary game point of view that the
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Nash equilibrium point in mixed strategies, E4, is unstable (see Fig.4). The
population mean fitness in both sexes is maximized at either E0 ≡ (e2, e2) or
E3 ≡ (e1, e1) and therefore, each of the two Nash equilibrium points in pure
strategies corresponds to ESS. It is to be noted that in the present subsection
and henceforth the analysis structure will mainly be based on the combining
result of the three propositions:
Proposition 4.1. The system of equations(2.5), is a regular, aggregate mono-
tonic selection dynamics (referring to Samuelson and Zhang [47]).
Proposition 4.2. The bimatrix game associated with the system of equa-
tions(2.5), follows the Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection (referring
to Weibull [42]).
Proposition 4.3. The asymmetric two-population game, adopts the follwing
inclusion relation (referring to Accinelli and Sanchez Carrera [48]):
ESSset ⊆ asymtotically stable set ⊆ NEset ⊆ equilibrium solution set
We know that the selection dynamics (2.5) is aggregate monotonic if for all
X ′, X ′′ ∈ ∆1, pi1(X ′, Y ) > pi1(X ′′, Y ) ⇒
∑i=27→1−y
i=17→y (x
′
i − x′′i )(wy− < w >) > 0
and for all Y ′, Y ′′ ∈ ∆2, pi2(Y ′, X) > pi2(Y ′′, X) ⇒
∑i=2 7→1−x
i=1 7→x (y
′
i − y′′i )(vx− <
v >) > 0. The first pair of expressions read as if the female allele population
vector Y is such that a mixed strategy X ′ would receive a higher payoff against
Y than would X ′′, then the approaching speed of the system is faster toward
X ′ than toward X ′′, in other words the tendency to move toward X ′ is higher
than toward X ′′. Similar type of significance can be drawn to the second pair of
expressions associated with the female allele population. We see that limx→0 x˙x
and limy→0 y˙y exist and are finite, i.e., the system of equations (2.5), is a regular
selection dynamics; therefore it is straightforward to verify that the replicator
dynamics (2.5) is aggregate monotonic. Also, the time derivatives of bilinear
average fitness functions pi1(X,Y ) and pi2(Y,X) along the solution path to the
replicator dynamics (2.5) through any given state (X,Y ) can be written as:
p˙i1(X,Y ) ≥
∑
xi(pi1(e
i, Y )− pi1(X,Y ))2 +m
∑
yi(pi2(e
i, X)− pi2(Y,X))2,
p˙i2(Y,X) ≥ 1
M
∑
xi(pi1(e
i, Y )− pi1(X,Y ))2 +
∑
yi(pi2(e
i, X)− pi2(Y,X))2
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where m ≤ pi1(X,ej)pi2(ej ,X) ≤M or 1M ≤
pi2(Y,e
i)
pi1(ei,Y )
≤ 1m , m and M being lower and upper
bounds respectively. That is p˙i1(X,Y ) ≥ 0 and p˙i2(Y,X) ≥ 0 with equality if
and only if (X,Y ) belongs to the equilibrium solution set (the mathematical
proof of our assertion is recorded in Appendix C: Supplemental materials).
Consequently, Proposition 4.2 is valid for all bimatrix games. And the inclusion
relation connected to NEset (Nash equilibrium set) is applicable in the aspect
of Fishman [49].
We return to our main arena. In the fitness respect, favoring A2 allele
in the male population and A1 allele in the female population, all the phase
portraits in Fig.5 have been plotted where the invading powers of A1 male and
A1 female, however not linearly, depend on the factors | k − w22 | and 1|κ+v11|
respectively in dominant selection. In the overdominance, similar factors may be
represented as | k− 12w12 | and | κ− 12v21 | in the male population and the female
population respectively. At any set of segregation ratio values (k, κ), other than
Mendelian, the invading powers of A1 male and A1 female are both increased
with increasing of the recessive fitness strength. It is a singularity against our
expectation, and that can be explained by the high rates of invading power of A1
female. On the other hand, at the Mendelian segregation cases, the frequency
of A1 female under the overdominance and dominance fitness environments is
roughly affected by the fitness strength, and in contrast to that observation,
instead of A1 female, the frequency of A1 male remains almost unchanged in
the recessive environment.
Manifolds divide the whole state space into the four parts and size of each
part is dependent on the set value of segregation ratios (k, κ). It can be shown
that at Mendelian segregation the sizes of the four parts are nearly equal to
each other in most of the fitness environments. The observation expresses the
fact that the evolution always tends to follow not only a 1 : 1 sex ratio but also
a 1 : 1 different alleles ratio at particular gene locus. In most of the cases, if
k > κ and if the considered trajectories having the initial value (i.v.) condition,
yi.v. > xi.v., then those trajectories would have high valued radius of curvature;
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in other words, under this circumstance the frequency of A1 female would vary
in a wide range, while if κ > k and if xi.v. > yi.v. then opposite scenario would
find – the frequency of A1 male would vary in a wide range ( see Fig.5 ). All
the observations having been pointed out in this and preceding paragraphs have
strong evidences for validity in view of the numerical data analysis, but I have
no mathematical proof (the details of these numerical evidences are provided in
the Appendix C: Supplemental materials).
Using calculus procedure to find out interior mixed Nash equilibrium points
in a bimatrix game, we can here calculate a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies,
which is given by ((a6a7 , 1 − a6a7 ), (a1a3 , 1 − a1a3 )). The derivation is postponed to
Appendix C: Supplemental materials. At this point, the population mean
fitness in both sexes is maximized over those variables that the alleles control.
However, except the recessive fitness, in the dominance and overdominance, it
is not possible to determine such analytical Nash equilibrium because in those
fitness structures a1 and a6 are always negative. The mentioning point explains
the reality that E5 is asymptotically stable in the dominance and overdominance
because there is no other Nash equilibrium. In whole feasible state space (1, 0)×
(0, 1), at the point of numeral Nash equilibrium E5, the population mean fitness
in both sexes is locally maximized, while due to the presence of analytical Nash
equilibrium point, the instability of E5 in the recessive fitness structure can
be explained by the concept of the Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection.
Here, it should be kept in mind that, the space of segregation ratio values, (k, κ),
with the particular fitness values may yield an unstable polymorphic equilibrium
which is not to be a Nash equilibrium.
From the different angle of evolutionary game theory, one can point out the
three possibilities for the selection dynamics between two alleles A1 and A2
(strategies) to study the nature of fitness structure based on the behavior of
polymorphic equilibrium E5. The cases related to the three possibilities may be
discussed in the following way [50, 51]:
• A1 and A2 try to coexist in the female allele population while in the male
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allele population A1 and A2 try to reach bistable form. The observation
corresponds to a saddle point E5 in the recessive fitness structure ( see
Fig.5 ). And this is the case if w11 > 2(1 − k)w12rxy, w22 > 2kw12,
v11 < 2(1−κ)v21ryx and v22 < 2κv21. It is anticipated that the inequalities
will be satisfied on the phase space trajectories along with for all points
of the two manifolds. The outcomes of the selection dynamics depend on
the initial condition.
• A1 and A2 coexist in both sexes, that corresponds to the stable E5. And
this is the case if w11 < 2(1−k)w12rxy, w22 < 2kw12, v11 < 2(1−κ)v21ryx
and v22 < 2κv21. There is no doubt that paths of all trajectories on the
state space (1, 0)× (0, 1) will follow the rule that governs simultaneously
by four inequalities.
• The neutral case can be considered if the payoff bimatrices of both sexes
are identical with identical rows and if the frequencies of alleles are same
in both sexes where evolution dynamics do not move and every point of
the interval [0, 1] is an equilibrium point. However, it does not have any
biological significance.
Finally, we complete this subsection to claim the Proposition 4.4, that is
true in accordance with the proof - outline of Gasull and Giacomini [52].
Proposition 4.4. The system of equations (2.5), has no limit cycle.
Proof. To prove the result, first we write the system of equations (2.5), in the
following form,
x˙ = x(g0(x) + g1(x)y), y˙ = y(h0(x) + h1(x)y)
where g0(x) = (a1x− a4), g1(x) = (a2 − a3x), h0(x) = (a5x− a8) and h1(x) =
(a6 − a7x). Now, if there exists a limit cycle, then g1(x) 6= 0, otherwise either
x = x¯ is an invariant line while g0(x¯) = 0 as well as g1(x¯) = 0 or we get a
non-periodic parametric expression of x - component. That is, we can always
assume that g1(x) does not vanish in the region where can have a periodic orbit.
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First Column Second Column Third Column
Fig. 5: Array representation of segregation distortion effect on the nature and position of
the internal equilibrium. Consider the initial array values of the fitnesses of Fig.2 with the
same plot configuration; i.e., along the first, second and third columns the cases of dominant,
recessive and overdominant selections have been depicted, respectively. In the array represen-
tation, the segregation configuration is carried out by the two sets of segregation ratio values
(k, κ) = (0.79, 0.05) and (k, κ) = (0.05, 0.79) to consider along the first row and the second
row respectively, where different alleles are favored in the two sexes. Although w21 and v12 are
undefined at any boundary point, some boundary points have been taken as initial points since
the dynamical system is regular. The dotted lines represent the manifold (eigenspace). In
recessive fitness, one of the manifolds is stable and other is unstable, whereas both manifolds
are stable in the dominant and overdominant selections.
Next, we consider the family of Dulac function ψ(x, y) = yλ−1Z(x), where
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Z(x) is an unknown function and λ is to be defined later. Thus, we have
M(x, y) =
∂
∂x
[ψ(x, y)x(g0(x) + g1(x)y)] +
∂
∂y
[ψ(x, y)y(h0(x) + h1(x)y)]
= [(xg0(x)Z(x))
′
+ λh0(x)Z(x)
+((xg1(x)Z(x))
′
+ (λ+ 1)h1(x)Z(x))y]y
λ−1.
The solutions to the differential equation
(xg1(x)Z(x))
′
+ (λ+ 1)h1(x)Z(x) = 0
are
Zx0(x) =
exp[−(λ+ 1) ∫ x
x0
h1(s)
sg1(s)
ds]
xg1(x)
where x0 > 0 is an arbitrary initial count. Therefore, taking the Dulac function
ψ˜(x, y) = yλ−1Zx0(x) where Zx0(x) is the solution to the above first-order
differential equation, we can obtain after some simple algebraic manipulation
that
M(x, y) =
Zx0(x)
g1(x)
[
xg21(x)
(g0(x)
g1(x)
)′
+ λ(g1(x)h0(x)− g0(x)h1(x))
−g0(x)h1(x)
]
.
Thus, we can choose the value of λ such that M(x, y) does not change sign
in (1, 0) × (0, 1) region, since all the involved functions are bounded in the
considering region. Hence, by Bendixson-Dulac Theorem, the claim is proved.
4.2. Population genetics in group selection framework
We start the subsection with some redefining cornerstones of game theory in
the flavor of group structure. The redefining concept is based on the analytical
thinking of the group selection of Jensen and Rigos [40], with adopting the two
acronyms: NEGS and ESSGS.
As at the Nash equilibrium average fitness is optimized and it strengthens
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the equilibrium concept, therefore (p∗, q∗) is a Nash equilibrium with group
selection (NEGS) if
(p∗, 1− p∗).(piC(p∗, q∗), piD(p∗, q∗)) ≥ (p, 1− p).(piC(p∗, q∗), piD(p∗, q∗)),
(q∗, 1− q∗).(pi′C(q∗, p∗), pi
′
D(q
∗, p∗)) ≥ (q, 1− q).(pi′C(q∗, p∗), pi
′
D(q
∗, p∗))
for all (p, q). The (p∗, q∗) is a best reply to itself in the both populations, and if it
is unique then the Nash equilibrium is called strict. On the other hand, we have
already noted in the preceding subsection that the most commonly used solution
concept in evolutionary game theory is that of an evolutionarily stable strategy
(ESS) and the central idea behind the ESS concept is that of non-invasion.
Here, ESS which is usually defined in games with random mating/matching
can be to include non-random mating in the following way: A strategy (p˜, q˜)
is an evolutionarily stable strategy with group selection (ESSGS), if for each
(p, q), not equal to (p˜, q˜), there exists ˜(p˜,q˜) such that
(p˜, 1− p˜).(piC(P,Q), piD(P,Q)) > (p, 1− p).(piC(P,Q), piD(P,Q)),
(q˜, 1− q˜).(pi′C(Q,P), pi
′
D(Q,P)) > (q, 1− q).(pi
′
C(Q,P), pi
′
D(Q,P))
for all  ∈ (0, ˜(p˜,q˜)), where P = p + (1 − )p˜ and Q = q + (1 − )q˜. The al-
gebraic inequalities express that with new population composed of (1− )(p˜, q˜)-
strategists and (p, q)-strategists, a small but measurable (of measurable  up to
˜(p˜,q˜)) group of individuals using any strategy (p, q), exclusion of ESSGS (p˜, q˜),
can not invade the male population and the female population where all individ-
uals use an ESSGS (p˜, q˜). Individuals using ESSGS will get a higher expected
payoff than the invaders. And, hence, with similar fashion we can define Local
Superiority: (p¯, q¯) is called locally superior if there exists a neighborhood U of
(p¯, q¯) such that exclusion of (p¯, q¯) for all (p, q),
(p¯, 1− p¯).(piC(p, q), piD(p, q)) > (p, 1− p).(piC(p, q), piD(p, q)),
(q¯, 1− q¯).(pi′C(q, p), pi
′
D(q, p)) > (q, 1− q).(pi
′
C(q, p), pi
′
D(q, p)).
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Clearly, (p˜, q˜) is an ESSGS if and only if it is locally superior.
We now come to the phase portrait structure. Specifically, an equilibrium
solution (p(t), q(t)) = E6 to equations (2.6) is asymptotically stable if every
solution to equations (2.6) which starts sufficiently close to E6 at initial time,
t = 0, not only remains close to E6 for all future time but ultimately approaches
E6 as t approaches infinity. More precisely, E6 is asymptotically stable if there
exists a neighborhood U of E6 such that (p(0), q(0)) ∈ U ⇒ limt→∞(p(t), q(t)) =
E6. Therefore, the conclusion can be taken as the following proposition:
Proposition 4.5. If the equilibrium solution E6 of equations (2.6) is asymp-
totically stable, then it is locally superior as well as ESSGS.
As, the system of equations (2.6), is a regular monotonic selection dynamics,
E6 is a NEGS, and as E6 is not solution to the system of equations:
∂p¯i(p,q)
∂p =
0 and ∂p¯i
′
(q,p)
∂q = 0, i.e., NEGSset is not singleton, we obtain the following chain
of inclusions:
ESSGSset ⊆ asymtotically stable set ⊆ NEGSset ⊆ equilibrium solution set
Fig. 6: Row representation of segregation distortion effect on the nature and position of
the internal equilibrium. The same plot configuration of viability effects of Fig. 3 has been
followed, where in the first, second and third figures, the sets of segregation ratio values are
(k, κ) = (0.8, 0.95), (k, κ) = (0.79, 0.75) and (k, κ) = (0.90, 0.92), respectively.
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Hence, if it is imposed that at the boundary, all the involved biological pa-
rameters are defined, then we observe that in the recessive selection environment
of non-random mating, the equilibrium point E0 corresponds to ESSGS while
E6 is a saddle point (see Fig.6). The size of the basin of attraction of E0 is
larger than the effective region of E6, where the position of E6 is in the vicinity
of E3 and with high set values of (k, κ), E6 approaches to E3; in other words, the
whole state approaches to A2 allele-state. Below the bifurcation value of mating
parameter α, in the overdominant selection, E6 turns to ESSGS – alleles A1
and A2 are coexisted in both the male and female populations – whereas the
corner points are unstable and E6 tends to E0 with high values of (k, κ) that be-
ing confined in the feasible region. Within the unstable feasible region of (k, κ)
in the overdominant selection, E6 becomes a saddle point, placed near about
E0. It is seen that the two boundary points on p-axis and q-axis act as ESSGS
where the point on q-axis has a larger basin of attraction than the other point.
Here is no doubt that at Mendelian segregation, the possibility to find out a
polymorphic equilibrium point is to be relatively low. As modeling results are
obtained mainly based on the varying values of two segregation ratio parameters
and one mating parameter under the assumption of the Fundamental Theorem
of Natural Selection those have strong biological influences on the stability of
genotype or phenotype character, thus every single result has its own biological
relevance which is intuitively understandable.
5. Discussion and future work
Generally, population genetics deals with discrete generations where the pop-
ulation moves into Hardy-Weinberg proportions in one generation in such a way
that parents do not participate in further reproduction once the daughter gen-
eration is formed and are on longer counted as part of the population. This is a
reasonable assumption only for some real-world populations in which organisms
breed synchronously and only once in their lifetime. However, in the case of re-
production and / or overlapping generations, to develop the continuous genetic
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realistic model is quite significant, by focusing the assumption that births and
deaths can take place at any instant. Referred to this many continuous mod-
els have been formulated in respect of various mathematical formulations (see
Ewens [45], Felsenstein [53] and references therein). Among them, the mathe-
matical structure of replicator selection dynamics is most realistic one, which
has been shown in this article by revealing the fact that, without imposing any
additional constraint, Hardy-Weinberg frequencies hold in replicator model in
the sense of, p˙i1(X,Y ) = 0 and p˙i2(Y,X) = 0 if and only if the population in
equilibrium. Side by side, it is also noticed that the evolution occurs fastest
when the variance in fitness is maximized.
In the present article, a one-locus model of continuous replicator selection
dynamics deriving from the discrete genetic model of sex-specific viabilities un-
der the consideration of nonequivalence of the viabilities of reciprocal heterozy-
gotes that might be observed at an imprinted locus is studied in aspect of the
sex-specific meiotic drive. The study was motivated to construct the set of link-
results between population genetics and evolutionary game theory where the
group selection theory is also incorporated. It is known that in the discrete ge-
netic model, in the case of Mendelian segregation, the change in gene frequency
is linearly related to the rate of change of population mean viability fitness [7];
because of that the stable polymorphic equilibrium maximizes the population
mean fitness. Analytically, in the game theory standpoint, it is not possible to
show that under the feasible values of biological parameters, there exists a Nash
equilibrium point or a point of ESS, the point at which the population mean fit-
ness is maximized, over those variables that the allele controls. Only the special
case of underdominance we find out the point of pure ESS. However, regard-
ing the segregation in both scenarios of dominant and overdominant selections,
E5 corresponds to the point of ESS as the point is asymptotically stable in
the dynamical structures of those selections where the Fundamental Theorem
of Natural Selection is held. That is, the model suggests that in asymmetric
games mixed ESS can exist. It simply supported the conclusion of Binmore
and Samuelson [54] of the existence of a mixed ESS in an asymmetric game in
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contradiction to the classic theorem of Selten [55].
Quantitative genetics has an inherited pattern of thought to construct ge-
netic models of the evolutionary process in flavor of evolutionary game dynamics.
In this branch, construction of models is initiated from the phenotype levels, and
selection terms are decomposed into the components to relate phenotypes to fit-
ness (selection differentials) and genes to phenotypes (heritability). Queller [56]
provides a general rule for determining when such decomposition is justified and
shows how Price’s covariance equation is associated with standard quantitative
genetic results and derives quantitative genetic equations for inclusive fitness
and group selection. Price’s equation represents the dynamics of changing gene
frequencies, and inclusive fitness theory provides conditions for the evolutionary
success of a gene. Hamilton’s inclusive fitness theory says that if an allele in
individual A increases the fitness of individual B whose degree of relatedness
to A is r and if c is the cost to the altruist and b is the benefit to the recipient
of the altruistic behavior, then the allele will be favored by natural selection if
br > c where r is generally defined as the probability that the recipient of altru-
istic behavior has a copy of focal allele. As Hamilton’s rule presupposes weak
selection (i.e., population gene frequencies do not vary appreciably in a single
reproduction period), successful allele related to inclusive fitness will not move
to fixation in the genome. Moreover, mutation can act in such a way that the
frequency of focal allele remains unchanged. Although the inclusive fitness con-
cept is more general than kin selection, in the majority of the cases, it has been
shown that Hamilton’s rule in principle has a relationship with genealogy or kin
selection. Nowak et al. [57] point out that cooperators are favored over defec-
tors for weak selection if a condition holds that is of the form: something > cb
which is nothing but the mathematical expression of inclusive fitness, but typi-
cally that something is not always related to relatedness. In this present paper,
the inclusive fitness effect is neglected in comparison with the viability effect
and the mating parameter α of population structure, a specific form of that
something other than relatedness, is dependent on the social structure of the
reproduction population (see Gintis [58] and references therein).
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Since the population structure is a function of allele frequencies, its math-
ematical formalization implies group selection procedure of alleles. That is, in
case of the non-random mating, the single-locus-multiple-allele models will yield
more than one polymorphic equilibrium (see Gokhale and Traulsen [59]) whereas
only one polymorphic equilibrium, E6 exists in the single-locus-two-allele model.
Multiple allele configurations are exceedingly complex where alleles are usually
sequences that code for genes. Thus, to find out the realistic population struc-
ture as a function of allele sequences would be a topic for future research work
along with to investigate how the number of alleles (size of groups) influences
the polymorphic equilibria.
Feldman and Otto [4] presented the dynamical structure of one- and two-
locus multiple-allele viability system where in consideration of the role of recom-
bination the sex-determination system in Aedes aegypti was modeled in terms
of two linked genes and the treatment of segregation distorter complex had also
included at second locus. On the other hand, neglecting the important factor of
recombination Eshel [60] claims that the selection on unlinked modifiers favors
Mendelian segregation at a polymorphic locus. Allowing sex-specific segregation
distortion, Eshel’s model is further generalized by U´beda and Haig [61], but the
generalized model shows that natural selection favors departure from Mendelian
expectations. That is, the instability of Mendelian segregation requires a new
view for a satisfactory explanation of why Mendelian segregation is the rule.
At this stage, it is natural, the question then arises as to could the modified
replicator selection dynamics by adding recombination (see Gaunersdorfer et al.
[62]) explain the Mendelian-segregation’s ubiquity? In order to set up new per-
spectives between population genetics and evolutionary game theory, answering
this conundrum would be a challenging work.
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Appendix A. Replicator dynamics in group selection framework
To implement the group construction view of van Veelen [38] in a formulation
procedure of the group selection dynamics between a male allele population and
a female allele population, we consider that two sexes of m and n alleles form
separately two groups of alleles of size (m−1)+(n−1) those adopt two strategies
(and interpret phenotypic characters) – C, defines the character of cooperating
and D, links to the character of defecting; i.e., each group in each sex, consists
of (m − 1) alleles of male and (n − 1) alleles of female 1, and after the group
formation, we assume that all alleles (entities) of the group, irrespective of their
origin, are the alleles of the sex which forms the group. For each sex, groups
are of any composition and they are formed by a non-random way in respect
of the two strategies. In the course of the group formation by every allele, we
use indexing of alleles in the both sexes. The m alleles in the male are indexed
as 0, 1, 2, ....,m − 1 and similarly to m alleles, for the n alleles of the female,
we give indices of 0, 1, 2, ...., n − 1. As genotype is an allelic pair, at a single
locus diploid population the numerical value of m will necessarily be equal to n;
and the necessity also explains the fact why every allele of both sexes does not
participate in all the group formations at a time. Intention of introducing the
two distinct counters is to represent the mixing groups of alleles of the sexes.
Here, the group selection dynamics proceeds through the two steps at each time
division: in the first step, the distinct and identical groups are formed by alleles
at the particular gene locus of the both sexes with assortative copy, and, in the
1Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allele, Proposed since June 2014): A pop-
ulation or species of organisms typically includes multiple alleles at each locus among various
individuals.....For example, at the gene locus for the ABO blood type carbohydrate antigens
in humans.....It is now known that each of the A, B, and O alleles is actually a class of
multiple alleles with different DNA sequences that produce proteins with identical properties:
more than 70 alleles are known at the ABO locus.
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second step, after the group formation, strategists are selected by the viability
effect where the effect is influenced by the group frequencies. To keep things as
simple as possible, realizable other biological influenced factors are ignored in
the considering framework.
Frequencies of the different types of groups are denoted by fi,j in the
male allele population and by νj,i in the female allele population where i =
0, 1, .....m − 1, j = 0, 1, .....n − 1, and are defined as fi,j and νj,i being the fre-
quency of groups with (i+ j) C alleles and m+ n− (i+ j + 2) D alleles in it.
Subscript i denotes the number of male-C alleles and j denotes the number of
female-C alleles in the groups. As population states are to be characterized by
the group frequencies, the frequencies have to satisfy the following conditions:
0 ≤ fi,j ≤ 1 for all i, j and
∑m−1
i=0
∑n−1
j=0 fi,j = 1 in male allele population,
and 0 ≤ νj,i ≤ 1 for all i, j and
∑n−1
j=0
∑m−1
i=0 νj,i = 1 in female allele popu-
lation, where the marginal frequencies can be defined as fi =
∑n−1
j=0 fi,j and
νj =
∑m−1
i=0 νj,i. fi,j and νj,i are confined in the simplex ∆1 of (m + n − 1)-
dimension and the simplex ∆2 of (m+ n− 1)-dimension, respectively.
Hence, if the frequencies of the male-C alleles and the female-C alleles are
denoted by p and q respectively, then according to the group formation, the
frequencies are calculated as
p =
1
m+ n− 2
m−1∑
i=0
n−1∑
j=0
(i+ j)fi,j and q =
1
m+ n− 2
n−1∑
j=0
m−1∑
i=0
(i+ j)νj,i.
Now, we let fˆ and νˆ be population structure functions on the simplexes ∆1
and ∆2 respectively, and the corresponding mapping expressions are fˆ : [0, 1]×
[0, 1]→ ∆1 and νˆ : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ ∆2. By the following relations, the functions
can be associated with frequencies p and q,
1
m+ n− 2
m−1∑
i=0
n−1∑
j=0
(i+ j)fˆi,j(p, q) = p for all (p, q) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1],
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1m+ n− 2
n−1∑
j=0
m−1∑
i=0
(i+ j)νˆj,i(q, p) = q for all (q, p) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1]
where fˆi,j(p, q) and νˆj,i(q, p) are the components of a population structure func-
tion in males and a population structure function in females respectively; and,
therefore, the sets of population structures in the male allele population and
female allele population are obtained as
S1 = {fˆ :→ ∆1 | 1
m+ n− 2
m−1∑
i=0
n−1∑
j=0
(i+j)fˆi,j(p, q) = p ∀(p, q) ∈ [0, 1]×[0, 1]},
S2 = {νˆ :→ ∆2 | 1
m+ n− 2
n−1∑
j=0
m−1∑
i=0
(i+j)νˆj,i(q, p) = q ∀(q, p) ∈ [0, 1]×[0, 1]}.
For males, the game payoffs (i.e., fitnesses) are denoted by piC,i,j and piD,i,j
which are the payoffs to a C allele and a D allele respectively when there are
total (i+j) C alleles in the group, and those for females are pi
′
C,j,i and pi
′
D,j,i.
Hence, under the population structures fˆ and νˆ, the expected fitness payoffs
of playing strategy C and strategy D in the male allele population and female
allele population can be computed in a straightforward way:
[ piCpiD
pi
′
C
pi
′
D
]
=
[
1
(m+n−2)p
∑m−1
i=0
∑n−1
j=0 (i+ j)fˆi,j(p, q)piC,i,j
1
(m+n−2)(1−p)
∑m−1
i=0
∑n−1
j=0 (m+ n− (i+ j + 2))fˆi,j(p, q)piD,i,j
1
(m+n−2)q
∑n−1
j=0
∑m−1
i=0 (i+ j)νˆj,i(q, p)pi
′
C,j,i
1
(m+n−2)(1−q)
∑n−1
j=0
∑m−1
i=0 (m+ n− (i+ j + 2))νˆj,i(q, p)pi
′
D,j,i
]
.
Thus, pi = ppiC + (1 − p)piD and pi′ = qpi′C + (1 − q)pi
′
D are the average fitness
payoffs in the allele populations of male and female. Hence, the replicator
dynamics in the group selection framework is given by the differential equations
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p˙ = p
( 1
(m + n − 2)p
m−1∑
i=0
n−1∑
j=0
(i + j)fˆi,j(p, q)piC,i,j −
[ p
(m + n − 2)p
m−1∑
i=0
n−1∑
j=0
(i + j)fˆi,j(p, q)piC,i,j
+
1 − p
(m + n − 2)(1 − p)
m−1∑
i=0
n−1∑
j=0
(m + n − (i + j + 2))fˆi,j(p, q)piD,i,j
])
,
q˙ = q
( 1
(m + n − 2)q
n−1∑
j=0
m−1∑
i=0
(i + j)νˆj,i(q, p)pi
′
C,j,i −
[ q
(m + n − 2)q
n−1∑
j=0
m−1∑
i=0
(i + j)νˆj,i(q, p)pi
′
C,j,i
+
1 − q
(m + n − 2)(1 − q)
n−1∑
j=0
m−1∑
i=0
(m + n − (i + j + 2))νˆj,i(q, p)pi
′
D,j,i
])
,
on the invariant space [0, 1]× [0, 1]. Here, it is to be ensured (fˆ , νˆ) satisfying the
condition of Lipschitz continuous so that the system of differential equations has
unique solutions through every state (p(0), q(0)) ∈ ∆1 and (q(0), p(0)) ∈ ∆2.
For the sake of interpretation of the dynamical system, some multiple terms
remain in unsimplified forms.
Appendix B. Population structures
It is rare that individuals in population truly mate random. In most of
the cases, populations are spatially structured and individuals are more likely
to mate with other that are nearly than with individuals from farther away
(cause for geographical location). Not only that, often social structure does limit
mating opportunities on others within the group. On this standpoint, in order
to put mathematical tractability, it is the best choice of population structure
to take a mixture of random grouping and clonal interaction. Therefore, on
consideration of diploid population at autosomal locus, we get the following
expressions of group frequencies:
[ fˆ0,0(p, q) νˆ0,0(q, p)fˆ0,1(p, q) νˆ0,1(q, p)
fˆ1,0(p, q) νˆ1,0(q, p)
fˆ1,1(p, q) νˆ1,1(q, p)
]
=
[ (1− α)(1− p)(1− q) + α(1− p) (1− α)(1− p)(1− q) + α(1− q)(1− α)q(1− p) (1− α)p(1− q)
(1− α)p(1− q) (1− α)q(1− p)
(1− α)pq + αp (1− α)pq + αq
]
where α is the mating parameter. With α = 0, fˆi,j and νˆj,i adopt random
selection and associated expected fitness payoffs of C allele and D allele in the
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both sexes are:
[ piCpiD
pi
′
C
pi
′
D
]
=
[ 12p (fˆ0,1piC,0,1 + fˆ1,0piC,1,0 + 2fˆ1,1piC,1,1)1
2(1−p) (2fˆ0,0piD,0,0 + fˆ0,1piD,0,1 + fˆ1,0piD,1,0)
1
2q (νˆ0,1pi
′
C,0,1 + νˆ1,0pi
′
C,1,0 + 2νˆ1,1pi
′
C,1,1)
1
2(1−q) (2νˆ0,0pi
′
D,0,0 + νˆ0,1pi
′
D,0,1 + νˆ1,0pi
′
D,1,0)
]
=
[ w11.q + 2kw12.(1− q)2(1− k)w12rpq.q + w22.(1− q)
v11.p+ 2κv21.(1− p)
2(1− κ)v21rqp.p+ v22.(1− p)
]
That is, here, the replicator dynamics of group selection does indeed encompass
the replicator dynamics of game theory.
At the other hand extreme point, α = 1, fˆi,j and νˆj,i follow the non-random
clonal interaction framework where all selected groups are homogeneous in the
sense that the groups consist of either C alleles or D alleles; such grouping
reveals simply the clonal interaction character [31].
Appendix C. Supplemental materials
Additional materials as a separate file under the heading of Supplemental
Materials accompanies the paper in Elsevier Web products, including ScienceDi-
rect: http://www.sciencedirect.com.
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